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MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
THE MISPLACED ROLE OF ACCREDITATION IN
THE FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN SYSTEM
Kathleen Negri*
In 2013, outstanding student loan balances in the United States exceeded
$994 billion. This growing volume of student debt has had far-reaching
consequences for both individual borrowers and society as a whole. In
many ways, the federal student loan program, available to students under
the Higher Education Act (HEA), has achieved its goal of making higher
education more accessible. Undergraduate college enrollment increased
from 10.5 million students in 1980 to 17.6 million students in 2009. Despite
the benefit of increased enrollment, however, the federal loan program has
been criticized for increasing student loan debt and contributing to the
“student loan crisis.” This student loan crisis threatens to undermine the
purpose of the HEA by making higher education less accessible to
Americans.
Higher education institutions must be accredited to be eligible for Title
IV federal funding under the HEA. The federal government relies on
accreditation to assess the academic quality of the institutions and
programs to which it provides federal funding. This federal fundingaccreditation relationship, riddled with conflicts of interest, has been
ineffective in regulating student loans, contributing to the mounting student
loan debt. This Note examines the relationship between the federal student
loan system and accrediting bodies through economic theory, ultimately
arguing that the HEA be amended to decouple accreditation and federal
student loans.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1907
I. BACKGROUND ON THE STUDENT LOAN CRISIS................................... 1908
A. The Rise of Student Loans....................................................... 1908
1. Federal Student Loan Programs ....................................... 1909
a. The Structure of Federal Loan Programs .................. 1909
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2012, Villanova
University. Many thanks to Professor John Pfaff for his guidance during the writing of this
Note and to the Villanova School of Business for first teaching me the importance of
understanding economics. I am also forever grateful to my family and friends for their
endless support and encouragement.

1905

1906

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

b. Institutional Eligibility Rules ..................................... 1911
2. The Private Loan Market ................................................. 1912
3. The Student Loan Crisis................................................... 1913
B. Accreditation: The Gatekeeper to Federal Funds ................. 1916
1. The Structure of the Accreditation Industry .................... 1916
a. The Purposes of Accreditation ................................... 1916
b. The Players in Accreditation ...................................... 1918
2. The Process of Accreditation ........................................... 1919
3. Accreditation and Federal Funding .................................. 1920
4. Regulating Accreditation ................................................. 1921
a. The Competitive Market ............................................. 1921
b. Government Regulation ............................................. 1922
i. Recognition .......................................................... 1923
ii. Governance Standards ......................................... 1925
II. ECONOMIC THEORIES ........................................................................ 1926
A. Agency Theory ........................................................................ 1926
1. Agency Theory Generally ................................................ 1926
2. Agency Theory in Different Contexts .............................. 1927
3. Reducing Agency Costs ................................................... 1928
B. Principles of Valuation ........................................................... 1930
1. The Subjective Theory of Value ...................................... 1930
2. Methods of Valuing Education ........................................ 1932
a. Financial Valuation of Education .............................. 1932
b. Input Valuation .......................................................... 1933
c. Output Valuation ........................................................ 1933
d. Comprehensive Rating Systems.................................. 1934
III. THE FUNDING-ACCREDITATION DILEMMA & PROPOSED
SOLUTIONS ................................................................................... 1934
A. The Funding-Accreditation Dilemma Generally .................... 1935
B. Government and Accreditors: A Principal-Agent
Relationship .......................................................................... 1935
C. Proposals for Reform ............................................................. 1938
1. Proposal One: Maintain the Status Quo .......................... 1939
2. Proposal Two: Change the Pay Structure ....................... 1939
3. Proposal Three: Define “Quality” Education.................. 1939
4. Proposal Four: Encourage Competition Among
Accreditors ...................................................................... 1940
5. Proposal Five: Decouple Accreditation and Federal
Student Loans .................................................................. 1940
IV. DECOUPLING ACCREDITATION AND FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS..... 1940
A. The Failure of Outcome-Based and Behavior-Based
Governance ........................................................................... 1940
B. Decoupling Accreditation and Federal Student Loans........... 1943
1. Flawed Proposals for Reform .......................................... 1943

2014]

MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM

1907

2. The Benefits of Decoupling ............................................. 1944
a. Fulfilling the Government’s and Accreditors’
Interests .................................................................... 1944
b. Encouraging Innovation in Higher Education ........... 1945
c. Generating Competition Among Accreditors ............. 1945
d. Increasing Transparency in the Industry ................... 1946
3. Criticisms of Decoupling ................................................. 1947
a. Creating a New Bureaucracy ..................................... 1947
b. Eliminating the Role of Accreditation ........................ 1947
c. Funding the “Wrong” Schools ................................... 1948
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1948
“Education is the key to opportunity in our society, and equality of
educational opportunity must be the birthright of every citizen.”1

INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, education has been regarded as an integral part of the
American dream, an individual’s pathway to opportunity and success.2
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Higher Education Act of
19653 (HEA), providing federal financial assistance to postsecondary
students, he was hoping to reduce financial barriers and provide equal
access to higher education.4
Since 1965, however, changing political, social, and economic factors
have turned this American dream into American debt. From 2004 to 2012,
the number of student borrowers increased 70 percent.5 In 2013,
outstanding student loan balances in the United States exceeded $994
billion.6 Students, the government, and, ultimately, taxpayers, shoulder the
burden of this student loan crisis.7
Under the HEA, higher education institutions must be accredited by a
recognized accrediting body in order to be eligible for these Title IV federal

1. Presidential Statement Announcing the Calling of a White House Conference on
Education, 2 PUB. PAPERS 291 (June 1, 1965).
2. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Student Debt and the Crushing of the American
Dream, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013, 9:09 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
05/12/student-debt-and-the-crushing-of-the-american-dream/?_php=true&_type=blogs&
_r=0.
3. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1161aa-1).
4. See Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended
Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 505 (2000).
5. See DONGHOON LEE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT:
STUDENT DEBT 7 (2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
mediaadvisory/2013/Lee022813.pdf.
6. RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP. MICROECONOMIC STUDIES, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 1 (2013), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/householdcredit/DistrictReport_Q22
013.pdf [hereinafter RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP.].
7. See infra Part I.A.3.
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funds, earning accreditation the role of the gatekeeper of federal funds.8
The rise of the student loan crisis has led to increased scrutiny of the
accreditation industry. This federal funding-accreditation relationship,
riddled with conflicts of interest, has been ineffective in regulating student
loans, contributing to the mounting student loan debt.9
This Note examines the relationship between the federal student loan
program and accrediting bodies through economic theory. Part I of this
Note describes the institutional frameworks of the federal funding and
accreditation industries and how these two mismatched programs interact.10
Part II of this Note introduces two economic concepts at the core of the
dilemma: agency theory and principles of valuation.11 Part III discusses
the relationship between federal funding and accreditation through the lens
of agency theory, revealing the conflicting incentives of the government
and accreditors.12 Part III also considers proposed solutions to the
principal-agent problem, including decoupling the accreditation and federal
student loan programs.13 Finally, Part IV of this Note discusses the failure
of government regulation of accreditation, in part because these regulations
require a definition of “quality” education.14 Part IV concludes that
decoupling accreditation and federal student loans is therefore a necessary
step to the solvency and survival of the federal student loan program.15
I. BACKGROUND ON THE STUDENT LOAN CRISIS
Part I of this Note discusses the background and institutional frameworks
that have led to the current student loan crisis. Part I.A discusses the
federal student loan system and the impact of rising levels of student loan
debt on individual borrowers and the U.S. economy. Part I.B then discusses
the structure of the accreditation industry and this industry’s role as a
gatekeeper for federal student loans.
A. The Rise of Student Loans
In recent years, an increasing number of Americans have turned to
student loans to finance higher education.16 The level of student loan debt
nearly tripled between 2004 and 2012.17 As of June 30, 2013, outstanding
student loan balances in the United States reached a historical high of $994
billion.18 This growing debt volume, coupled with increasing delinquency

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part III.A–B.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See LEE, supra note 5, at 2.
Id. at 9.
See RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., supra note 6.
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rates, has led to a debate about how to manage—and potentially reform—
student loan programs.
This section first discusses how federal student loan programs operate. It
then briefly reviews the private market for student loans. Finally, it
addresses the student loan crisis and the effect this mounting debt has on
both individual student borrowers and the national economy.
1. Federal Student Loan Programs
Students seeking to finance higher education through loans can look to
either government programs or private lenders, but government loans
dominate the student loan market.19 The HEA, enacted in 1965 to increase
access to higher education for all Americans, created the current federal
student loan system.20 This section discusses (a) the structure of the federal
loan system and (b) the institutional eligibility rules that regulate which
higher education institutions can receive this federal funding.
a. The Structure of Federal Loan Programs
When the HEA was initially enacted in 1965, Title IV provided for fixedinterest, government-subsidized loans, that were issued through banking
institutions and backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.21
The HEA has been reauthorized nine times since its inception—most
recently in 2008—and is set for renewal in 2014.22
In 2010, the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA), part of
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, restructured the federal
student loan program.23 Under this new structure, the government is now
the sole originator of Title IV federal student loans, eliminating the
middleman role of banks in the loan process.24 The current federal student
loan regime promotes access to higher education by providing better loan

19. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the private loan market).
20. See Roots, supra note 4, at 504–05 (noting that while loans were offered as early as
1958, the HEA created the modern federal loan system); see also Matthew A. McGuire,
Note, Subprime Education: For-Profit Colleges and the Problem with Title IV Federal
Student Aid, 62 DUKE L.J. 119, 140 (2012).
21. See William S. Howard, The Student Loan Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law
School, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 485, 495 (2011).
22. See What You Need To Know About Reauthorization, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept.
19, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/What-You-Need-to-Know-About/141697/. The 2008
reauthorization of the HEA was called the Higher Education Opportunity Act (“HEOA”).
See Higher Education Opportunity Act—2008, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (June 25, 2010),
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/hea08/index.html. For the purposes of this Note,
HEA refers to the Higher Education Act as amended.
23. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010).
24. See Howard, supra note 21, at 485. Before SAFRA, the government used banking
institutions as middlemen and would subsidize and guarantee the loans these banks issued.
Id. The Department of Education seeks to save $68 billion dollars over the next eleven years
by eliminating the middleman banks. See Statement by President Barack Obama Upon
Signing H.R.4872 (Mar. 30, 2010), 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. S12, S15.
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terms than students would receive in the private loan market.25 Loans are
issued as part of the Federal Direct Loan Program and the Federal Perkins
Loan Program.26
Under the Direct Loan Program, the U.S. Department of Education
(USDE) issues loans directly to higher education institutions that borrowers
attend.27 There are two major sources of direct loans: Stafford Loans and
Parents Loans for Undergraduates (PLUS).28
There are three types of Stafford Loans available to students. First,
unsubsidized Stafford Loans are available for undergraduate and graduate
Second, subsidized Stafford Loans are available for
students.29
undergraduate students who can demonstrate financial need.30 These
subsidized loans have lower borrowing limits and interest rates are set at a
spread above the ten-year Treasury note rate.31 Third, graduate Stafford
Loans have a higher borrowing limit with interest rates slightly higher than
the undergraduate subsidized Stafford Loan.32
The second category of Direct Loans is the PLUS Loan.33 Parents of
undergraduates can borrow up to the cost of student attendance—including
tuition, housing, and expenses—through a PLUS Loan.34 Interest rates are
higher for PLUS Loans, and parents must pass a credit check to qualify.35
Graduate PLUS Loans are available for graduate students who exhaust their
financing options under Stafford Loans.36
In addition to Stafford and PLUS Direct Loans, the government operates
the Perkins Loan Program. While the government lends money under
direct loans, schools are the lenders for Perkins Loans.37 The government
provides schools with a level of funding, which participating schools must
25. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, NEW AM. FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2013
4:47 PM), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programsoverview.
26. See Federal Student Loan Programs, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (June 2013),
http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/federal-loan-programs.pdf.
27. See id. Though the government issues loans directly under this program, the
government hires private companies to process disbursements and loan repayments. See
Loan Servicers, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/
servicers#who-is-my-loan-servicer (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
28. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25. In addition to
Stafford and PLUS Loans, the government offers Direct Consolidation Loans that allow
borrowers to consolidate multiple federal loans into a single loan with a single interest rate.
Id.
29. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25.
30. See id. The amount a student can borrow for subsidized Stafford Loans depends on
the student’s classification as “dependent” or “independent.” Id. Independent students are
those who: are over 24 years old; have served in the military; are married; have legal
dependents; were an orphan until eighteen years old; or have unusual circumstances. Id.
These independent students have higher borrowing limits. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Federal Student Loan Programs, supra note 26.
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match and loan to students.38 This program provides low-interest loans for
students with “exceptional financial need.”39
Students borrowing through the Direct Loan or Perkins Program have
several repayment options. The standard repayment scheme is a ten-year,
monthly repayment plan.40 Students have the option of extending their
repayment schedules if they have higher student loan balances.41 For those
borrowers who exceed a certain debt-to-income ratio, SAFRA introduced
income-based repayment, which sets monthly payments at 10 percent of
income and forgives unpaid loans after between twenty and twenty-five
years (depending on the type of loan).42
b. Institutional Eligibility Rules
Students are given access to the federal student loan programs described
above with few prerequisites. Loans are available to students who typically
have “little or no credit or employment history” without regard for field of
study or academic performance.43 While some programs require a showing
of financial need, these programs exist to make loans readily available and
to encourage financing of higher education.44 Instead of assessing students’
ability to repay loans, the USDE attempts to regulate the higher education
institutions that receive the Title IV funding.45
There are two major requirements for all higher education institutions
and additional requirements for for-profit institutions. First, higher
education institutions must be accredited by a USDE-recognized accrediting
body to receive Title IV funding.46 Second, the higher education institution
cannot have an unacceptably high cohort default rate on existing Title IV
loans.47
For-profit institutions are subject to additional requirements, because
these schools are criticized for having a higher percentage of students
relying on government loans and defaulting on these loans.48 The 90/10
38. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25.
39. See Perkins Loans, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/perkins
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
40. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 145–49 (discussing institutional eligibility rules
including cohort default rates and the “90/10 rule”).
46. See infra Part I.B (discussing the accreditation process).
47. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.206 (2013). A cohort default rate measures the number of
students who default on student loans during a particular period compared to the number of
students who began repayment during that period. See id. § 668.183 (defining and specifying
how institutions are to calculate cohort default rates). Borrowers are in default if they are
270 to 360 days behind payment within the first three years of repayment, depending on the
type of loan. See id.
48. For an evaluation of the for-profit education industry, see generally DANIEL L.
BENNETT, ADAM R. LUCCHESI & RICHARD K. VEDDER, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY &
PRODUCTIVITY, FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: GROWTH, INNOVATION AND REGULATION
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rule requires for-profit institutions to receive at least 10 percent of their
revenue from non–Title IV sources.49 Additionally, these schools must
offer programs that prepare students for “gainful employment in a
recognized occupation.”50
In 2011, the USDE proposed additional institutional eligibility
requirements that would revise the definition of “gainful employment.”51
The USDE promulgated regulations redefining gainful employment
standards based on student outcomes, including loan repayment and debtto-earnings ratios.52 The D.C. Circuit held these rules to be arbitrary and
capricious.53 As of the publication of this Note, the USDE is redrafting
similar rules.54
2. The Private Loan Market
Though federal student loans are the primary form of student aid,
students can also obtain private loans from banking institutions.55 There
are an estimated $150 billion of private student loans outstanding,
approximately one-fifth of the federal loan volume.56 Prior to the 2008

(2010), available at http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/ForProfit_
HigherEd.pdf. Critics of the for-profit industry argue that these institutions encourage
“higher debt burdens and default rates.” See Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital:
Federally Funded Subprime Higher Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 441 (2012).
Supporters, on the other hand, argue that for-profit institutions offer “innovative practices”
that could benefit higher education. See Ben Wildavsky, For-Profit Lessons for All, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/03/01/essay-whatnonprofit-higher-ed-can-learn-profit-sector. This Note addresses for-profit and nonprofit
educational institutions alike.
49. See Braucher, supra note 48, at 455–56.
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)(A) (2012). These institutional eligibility requirements are
meant to ensure that students receiving federal loans attend quality institutions that prepare
these students for careers and allow them to repay their loans; however, the efficacy of these
requirements is often questioned. For example, cohort default rate rules are often criticized
for being inaccurate because the default rate focuses on a narrow timeframe. See McGuire,
supra note 20, at 145–46 (“[The] calculations are far too narrow to have any impact . . . .”).
Additionally, almost half of student loans are in grace periods or deferment, and are
therefore not included in cohort default rates. See RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., supra note
6, at 1 n.2. Similarly, the 90/10 rule is easily satisfied because other forms of federal
funding are calculated as part of the 10 percent, including veterans loans and training grants.
See Braucher, supra note 48, at 455–56. This Note focuses on the ineffectiveness of
accreditation as a gatekeeper to federal loans. See infra Part I.B.
51. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 127–28.
52. See id.
53. See Ass’n of Private Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
54. See Negotiated Rulemaking 2013–2014—Gainful Employment, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.
(Dec.
16,
2013),
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/
gainfulemployment.html (discussing the scheduling of negotiated rulemaking sessions to
resume discussions of the proposed gainful employment rules).
55. This Note focuses on federal loan programs; however, the private student loan
market supplements the public market. For a more in-depth discussion of the private loan
market, see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS (2012), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf.
56. Id. at 3.
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financial crisis, this private market was highly unregulated.57 Private loans
are riskier for students as they tend to have higher variable interest rates and
lack repayment flexibility.58 Financial institutions packaged and sold
Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities (SLABS), similar to mortgagebacked securities, without supervision.59
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act60 (DoddFrank) began a new era of regulation of the private student loan market in
response to the packaging of these SLABS.61 Dodd-Frank tightened
lending standards for banks.62 These banks, finding it more difficult to sell
student loans in this regulated market, are offering fewer loans or exiting
the student loan market entirely.63
3. The Student Loan Crisis
The federal student loan program has, in many ways, achieved its goal of
making higher education more accessible.
Undergraduate college
enrollment increased from 10.5 million students in 1980 to 17.6 million
students in 2009.64 Many argue that this increased enrollment benefited
American society by creating a more qualified, higher-paid workforce,
ultimately improving the quality of life.65
Despite the benefits of the federal loan system, the program has been
criticized for increasing student loan debt and contributing to the “student
loan crisis.”66 Student loan debt—the only category of household debt that

57. See id. at 28.
58. See id. at 3.
59. See id. at 17–18, 22–23.
60. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
61. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 55, at 68.
62. See id. at 3–4.
63. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan To End Student-Loan
Business, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323623304579057091084420988 (discussing J.P. Morgan Chase’s
departure from the student loan business).
64. Christopher Avery & Sarah Turner, Student Loans: Do College Students Borrow
Too Much—Or Not Enough?, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 167 (2012).
65. See C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt and the Future of Higher
Education, 34 J.C. & U.L. 79, 101 (2007) (noting that federal loans allow millions of
Americans to “enjoy a quality of life that would have been impossible without an
education”); Bradley J.B. Toben & Carolyn P. Osolinik, Nonprofit Student Lenders and Risk
Retention: How the Dodd-Frank Act Threatens Students’ Access to Higher Education and
the Viability of Nonprofit Student Lenders, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 158, 165–66 (2012)
(discussing the benefits of postsecondary education, including reduced reliance on public
assistance, healthier lifestyles, and reduced crime rates). This increased quality of life is
often measured by the income premium that higher education graduates earn. See generally
ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. AND THE WORKFORCE,
THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS (2011), available at
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/collegepayoff-complete.pdf
(concluding that workers with bachelor’s degrees on average earn 84 percent more over a
lifetime than those with only high school diplomas).
66. There is significant debate about whether the exponential increase in student loan
debt has fueled a higher education “bubble.” Compare Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun
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rose during the Great Recession—is second in volume only to mortgage
debt.67 The number of borrowers and the average balance per borrower
each increased 70 percent between 2004 and 2012.68
This high volume of lending propels an increase in tuition costs,
furthering the need for student loans in an unending cycle.69 Schools,
knowing that the government will continue to fund student loans, raise
tuition to “capture the federal money in circulation.”70 Many criticize the
federal student loan program for contributing to the problem that it seeks to
solve: the unaffordability of higher education.71
The high volume of student debt and the federal student loan system have
far-reaching consequences for both individual borrowers and society as a
whole. The program has resulted in (1) high default rates on loans,
(2) reduced mobility of students after graduation, and (3) a hindrance of
economic growth.
First, default rates have risen with the level of student debt.72 Students
defaulting on loans are faced with substantial fees and may have their
wages garnished.73 Defaults on student loans tarnish a borrower’s credit
score, lowering the student’s ability to purchase a home or car in the
Abraham, Options for Student Borrowers: A Derivatives-Based Proposal To Protect
Students and Control Debt-Fueled Inflation in the Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 67 (2010) (arguing that the student loan markets are showing the
“hallmarks of a bubble”), and Andrew Woodman, The Student Loan Bubble: How the
Mortgage Crisis Can Inform the Bankruptcy Courts, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 179, 186–91
(2013) (describing the creation of the student loan bubble), with Christopher Matthews, Stop
Calling Student Loans a “Bubble”!, TIME (Mar. 7, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/03/
07/viewpoint-stop-calling-student-loans-a-bubble/ (accusing Americans of having “[b]ubblephobia”), and Jordan Weissman, No, the Student Loan Crisis Is Not a Bubble, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 6, 2013 10:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/no-thestudent-loan-crisis-is-not-a-bubble/279398/ (“[I]t’s not helpful to think of student lending . . .
in terms of bubbles at all.”). For the purposes of this Note, the rise in student debt is referred
to only as a student loan “crisis.”
67. See LEE, supra note 5, at 5.
68. Id. at 9.
69. See Roots, supra note 4, at 506–08 (discussing federal aid as a factor contributing to
rising tuition).
70. Id.
71. William Bennett, the secretary of education during the Reagan Administration,
developed the theory that financial aid encourages colleges to raise tuition, now known as
the “Bennett Theory.” See William J. Bennett, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1987, at A31 (“[I]ncreases in financial aid . . . have enabled colleges and universities blithely
to raise their tuitions, confident that Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the
increase.”); see also Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 66, at 71 (“[G]overnment efforts at
‘access’ have spurred a dramatic increase in the cost of education.”); Stephanie Riegg Cellini
& Claudia Goldin, Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New Evidence on For-Profit
Colleges 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17827, 2012) (finding
that for-profit institutions with Title IV funding have higher tuitions, and Title IV–funded
programs within institutions have higher tuitions than programs within the same institution
that are not funded by Title IV).
72. The national cohort default rate steadily increased from 6.7 percent in 2007 to 10
percent in 2011. See Federal Student Loan Default Rates, NEW AM. FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2013,
9:46 PM), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-defaultrates.
73. See Braucher, supra note 48, at 476.
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future.74 The government and taxpayers ultimately bear the burden of this
default both because the government is not repaid and because defaulting
borrowers are more reliant on public assistance in the future.75
Second, even if students do not default on their federal loans, high levels
of indebtedness reduce students’ mobility after graduation.76 Students who
chose higher education to expand their opportunities are finding themselves
with limited options.77 Those with high debt burdens must seek
employment that compensates them to repay their debts, deterring them
from less lucrative careers.78 There is also a concern that this debt crisis is
increasing income disparities, creating a “two-tiered” education system that
distinguishes between those with loans and those without loans.79
Finally, the student loan crisis could hinder the growth of the U.S.
economy.80 Students and families burdened with high levels of student
loan debt may refrain from investing in homes, taking out loans for
businesses, or purchasing other consumer goods.81 Reduced levels of
consumption and investment slow economic growth, particularly as the
economy continues to recover from the Great Recession.82
The student loan crisis ultimately threatens to undermine the purpose of
the HEA by making higher education less accessible to Americans.
Students are faced with higher tuition costs and mounting debt, which leads
to default, immobility, and stagnant economic growth.83 The government
similarly increases its debt burdens as the number of loan defaults rises.84
These effects of a student loan debt crisis have sparked debate about if, and

74. See id. (citing Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed.
Reg. 34,386, 34,387 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668)); see also Anne
Marie Chaker, Students Borrow More Than Ever for College, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at
D1 (reporting that, in a 2006 survey of 1,508 college graduates under age thirty-five, student
loans forced 44 percent of those graduates to postpone purchasing a house and 28 percent to
delay having children). Student loans have these long-term effects in part because they are
not dischargeable in bankruptcy absent a showing of undue hardship, an incredibly high
standard that few students can meet. See Braucher, supra note 48, at 473 (noting that the
undue hardship standard is a “life sentence”).
75. See Roots, supra note 4, at 509–10 (“[S]tudent loan defaults cost the U.S. Treasury
billions of dollars per year.”); see also Woodman, supra note 66, at 181 (describing the
Treasury as “provid[ing] a backstop in the case of default”).
76. See Roots, supra note 4, at 521–22 (discussing postgraduate limitations).
77. See id.
78. See id.; see also Clive R. Belfield, Student Loans and Repayment Rates: The Role of
For-Profit Colleges, 54 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 2 (2013) (discussing how debt influences
labor market decisions).
79. See Roots, supra note 4, at 524–26; see also Belfield, supra note 78, at 3 (noting that
debt burdens and default rates are higher among minorities).
80. See Stiglitz, supra note 2 (“Student debt also is a drag on the slow [economic]
recovery that began in 2009.”).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

1916

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

how, the federal student loan program should be reformed to reduce student
debt.85
B. Accreditation: The Gatekeeper to Federal Funds
As discussed in Part I.A, federal student loans are available to students
who attend higher education institutions that meet a number of institutional
eligibility requirements.86 One of these requirements is that these
institutions be accredited by a USDE-recognized accrediting body, earning
accreditors the title of the gatekeeper to federal funds.87 Part I.B discusses:
(1) the structure of the accreditation industry; (2) the process of
accreditation; (3) the role accreditation plays in the distribution of federal
funds; and (4) the regulation of the accreditation industry.
1. The Structure of the Accreditation Industry
Despite the important role accreditation plays as an enforcer of academic
quality and a gatekeeper to federal funds, the American public does not
understand the accreditation industry.88 This section evaluates both the
purpose of this “obscure and opaque” industry89 and the key players in the
industry.
a. The Purposes of Accreditation
Modern accreditation began in the late-nineteenth century with the
formation of the New England Association of Schools and the Middle
States Association of Colleges.90 Academics formed these organizations to

85. The debate and speculation about the student loan debt crisis largely arose in the
wake of the Great Recession. Some believe that the mortgage crisis of 2008 and the student
loan crisis are similar. For an extensive comparison of the student debt crisis and the
mortgage bubble, see generally Braucher, supra note 48, Woodman, supra note 66, and
McGuire, supra note 20. Despite these similarities, there is still debate about whether the
student debt crisis poses a similar risk to the economy as the mortgage crisis did before the
Great Recession. Compare Antony Davies & James R. Harrigan, Why the Education Bubble
Will Be Worse Than the Housing Bubble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 12, 2012),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/06/12/the-governmentshouldnt-subsidize-higher-education (arguing that harsh bankruptcy standards and the
inability to resell an education make student loans more threatening than mortgages), with
Jeff Macke, Student Loans Are a Societal Problem, Not an Economic Threat, YAHOO FIN.
(Sept. 10, 2013 9:29 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/student-loans-societalproblem-not-economic-threat-economist-132904880.html (arguing that there is “minimal
systemic risk” associated with student debt).
86. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Part I.B.3.
88. Charles Powell, Accreditation, Assessment, and Compliance: Addressing the
Cyclical Challenges of Public Confidence in American Education, 3 J. ASSESSMENT &
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 54, 55 (2013).
89. Id. at 62.
90. See HANK BROWN, AM. ENTER. INST., CTR. ON HIGHER EDUC. REFORM, PROTECTING
STUDENTS AND TAXPAYERS: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S FAILED REGULATORY APPROACH
AND STEPS FOR REFORM 2 (2013), http://www.goacta.org/images/download/protecting_
students_and_taxpayers_report.pdf.
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define the bachelor’s degree and to encourage best practices among
colleges.91
Today, higher education institutions voluntarily92 engage in the
accreditation process, which remains a “nongovernmental, self-regulatory,
peer review system.”93 This peer-review system encompasses both quality
assurance and quality improvement.94 Accreditors assure quality by setting
universal standards that all institutions must achieve, and improve quality
by working with institutions to develop processes to better their educational
standards.95 Quality assurance and quality improvement reflect “the core
values of [American academia]: peer review, the centrality of [institutional]
mission, institutional autonomy, and academic freedom.”96 Accrediting
agencies judge academic quality based on a school’s ability to fulfill its
institutional mission, acknowledging the diversity of these institutions’
goals.97
The modern accreditation industry serves four main purposes. First,
accrediting agencies assist institutions with self-analysis and selfimprovement.98 Second, they engender public confidence by signaling to
students that an institution has a “seal of approval” and meets certain
standards.99 Third, accreditation creates a level of uniformity among higher
education institutions, enabling students to transfer between schools.100
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this Note, accreditation
determines an institution’s eligibility for federal funding.101

91. See id.
92. Though accreditation is considered a “voluntary” process, students who attend
unaccredited institutions are ineligible for federal student loans and grants. See infra Part
I.B.3; see also LINDSEY M. BURKE & STUART M. BUTLER, HERITAGE FOUND.,
ACCREDITATION: REMOVING THE BARRIER TO HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM 8 (2012),
available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED535877.pdf (discussing how accreditation has
become a “de facto requirement” for institutions). Because federal student aid and subsidies
have become an “increasingly large share” of institutions’ budgets, institutions have little
choice but to seek accreditation. See id. at 11.
93. Barbara Brittingham, Accreditation in the United States: How Did We Get to Where
We Are?, 2009 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 7, 10; see also What Is Accreditation?,
ADVANCED, http://www.advanc-ed.org/what-accreditation (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
94. See JUDITH S. EATON, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, AN OVERVIEW
OF U.S. ACCREDITATION 9 (2012), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/Overview%20of%
20US%20Accreditation%202012.pdf.
95. See JUDITH S. EATON, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, ACCREDITATION
AND RECOGNITION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2012), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/
AccredRecogUS_2012.pdf.
96. See Judith S. Eaton, The Future of Accreditation, 40 PLANNING FOR HIGHER EDUC. 8,
9 (2012).
97. See EATON, supra note 94, at 3.
98. See BROWN, supra note 90, at 1.
99. Id. at 5.
100. See id. at 1.
101. See id. (“[S]ince federal funding is the lifeblood of most higher education
institutions, accreditation determines whether a school can remain financially viable.”); see
also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing the connection between federal funding and accreditation).
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b. The Players in Accreditation
There are several key players in the accreditation process: the
educational institutions, accrediting organizations, recognition bodies, and
the government.102
Higher education institutions create, fund, and participate in accrediting
organizations.103 Accrediting organizations review and accredit educational
institutions and programs.104 Institutions and programs in turn pay annual
dues once they are accredited and fees for accreditation visits.105
Accreditation is a peer-review process wherein educators evaluate each
other and are primarily responsible for setting the industry’s academic
standards; therefore, accrediting organizations are products of and “derive
their legitimacy” from higher education as opposed to the government.106
Accrediting agencies are private, nongovernmental, nonprofit
organizations responsible for running the “decentralized and complex”
accreditation process.107 There are four general categories of accrediting
agencies in the United States: (1) regional accreditors, which review
institutions in a geographical region of the United States;108 (2) national
faith-related accreditors, which review religiously affiliated and doctrinally
based institutions; (3) national career-related accreditors, which review
“single-purpose institutions”; and (4) programmatic accreditors, which
review specific programs and professions (e.g., law and medicine).109 The
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), a private
organization, coordinates the broad range of accrediting agencies.110
The USDE asserts control by reviewing and regulating these accrediting
organizations.111 The government engages in a process known as
recognition to determine which accrediting agencies are reliable judges of
102. See EATON, supra note 95, at 3.
103. See id. at 4.
104. See id. at 3–4.
105. See id. at 7.
106. See EATON, supra note 94, at 2; see also Jon F. Wergin, Five Essential Tensions in
Accreditation, in INQUIRY, EVIDENCE, AND EXCELLENCE: THE PROMISE AND PRACTICE OF
QUALITY ASSURANCE 27, 27 (Mark LaCelle-Peterson & Diana Rigden eds., 2012) (“Unlike
virtually every other country, public accountability for quality [in the United States] is not a
function of government agency but of peer review.”).
107. EATON, supra note 94, at 1.
108. There are six USDE-recognized regional accreditors in the United States that “form
the heart of accreditation in America.” See BROWN, supra note 90, at 2. Regional
accreditation is viewed as a more traditional path for institutions, and regional accreditors are
often considered to be more reliable authorities. See Doug Lederman, Tussling Over
Transfer of Credit, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2007/02/26/transfer (discussing how some schools reject academic transfer credits from
nationally, but not regionally accredited colleges).
109. See EATON, supra note 94, at 2; see also Powell, supra note 88, at 65–66 (discussing
the different scopes of regional versus national accreditors and institutional versus
programmatic accreditors).
110. See EATON, supra note 94, at 6.
111. See id. at 5. CHEA also coordinates accrediting activity in the United States and
recognizes institutions. See id. For a more extensive discussion of recognition, see infra Part
I.B.4.
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quality.112 As of December 2011, there were seven USDE-recognized
regional accreditors, four national faith-related accreditors, seven national
career-related accreditors, and thirty-six programmatic accreditors.113
The USDE and the secretary of education are responsible for
promulgating rules under the HEA to regulate these recognized accrediting
agencies.114 The USDE also appoints members to the National Advisory
Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI).115 NACIQI is
responsible for advising the secretary and helping to generate the standards
for recognition.116
2. The Process of Accreditation
Higher education institutions may seek two different types of
accreditation:
institutional accreditation and/or programmatic or
specialized accreditation.117
When a school receives institutional
accreditation, this seal of approval applies to the entire college or university
and necessarily includes all programs and courses offered at that school.118
Programmatic or specialized accreditation, on the other hand, applies to
particular departments, schools, or programs within a university.119
The process of accreditation is similar for both institutional and
programmatic accreditation. Institutions are first required to engage in
“self-study.”120 During the self-study phase, the institution evaluates its
own performance based on the accrediting agency’s standards and submits a
written summary to the agency.121 The agency then begins a peer-review
process during which faculty and academic administrators review the
institution’s self-study results.122
Next, the accrediting agency sends a team to the institution for a site
visit.123 This team may include public, nonacademic members with an
interest in higher education.124 Finally, a decisionmaking commission of

112. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 5.
113. See EATON, supra note 95, at 4, 25. There are additional accrediting agencies that
have been recognized by the CHEA, but not the USDE. See infra Part I.B.4.
114. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 5–6.
115. See id.
116. See 20 U.S.C. § 1011c(c)(1) (2012); see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing the role of
NACIQI).
117. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 6–7.
118. See id.
119. See id. Institutions seeking programmatic accreditation of a particular program,
department, or school often already have institutional accreditation. See id. These
institutions may seek additional programmatic accreditation as a “quality control measure for
specific programs or departments” or to make their graduates eligible for credentialing
examinations. Id.; see also Accreditation in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html.
120. See EATON, supra note 94, at 4.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 5.

1920

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

the accrediting agency reviews the results of the studies, visits, and
determines if an institution is worthy of accreditation.125
Each accrediting agency creates its own guidelines for accreditation;
however, the regional accrediting agencies focus on similar qualities in the
institutions they review. For example, the Middle States Commission on
Higher Education, a USDE-recognized accrediting body, requires its
evaluators to consider the totality of the circumstances in reviewing an
institution’s credentials.126 Evaluators assess institutional resources (both
human and financial), leadership and governance, and administration as part
of the self-study.127 Each of these standards is interpreted in the “context of
the institution’s mission and situation.”128 Similarly, evaluators consider
student admissions, student support services, faculty, and educational
offerings to determine if these programs and services further this
mission.129
After evaluating the institution based on the agency’s standards, the
agency determines if an institution should be granted or denied
accreditation.130 The accrediting agency continues to monitor and
periodically review those institutions that receive accreditation.131 If an
accrediting agency decides to revoke accreditation at any time, the
institution has a right of appeal under the HEA.132
3. Accreditation and Federal Funding
As discussed in Part I.B.1 of this Note, higher education institutions have
relied on accreditation to ensure academic quality and earn public trust
since the nineteenth century;133 however, in the last sixty years,
accreditation has taken on a new role by providing access to billions of
dollars of federal funds.134 Higher education institutions must be accredited
by a USDE-recognized accrediting body to be eligible for Title IV federal
funding under the HEA.135 The federal government relies on accreditation

125. See id.
126. See MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCELLENCE
IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
REQUIREMENTS OF AFFILIATION AND STANDARDS FOR
ACCREDITATION, at viii (2011), available at http://www.msche.org/publications/CHX-2011WEB.pdf.
127. Id. at ix–xi.
128. Id. at viii; see also EATON, supra note 94, at 3 (“Institutional mission is central to
judgments of academic quality.”). The Middle States Commission on Higher Education,
similar to other accrediting agencies, sets broad guidelines for the institution’s mission: the
institutional purpose must be defined, indicating what the institution intends to accomplish
and whom it hopes to serve. See MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., supra note 126,
at ix.
129. See MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., supra note 126, at x.
130. See EATON, supra note 94, at 4–5.
131. See id.
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(6)(c) (2012).
133. See BROWN, supra note 90, at 2–3.
134. See Powell, supra note 88, at 63.
135. See 20 U.S.C. § 1002 (listing the requirements of institutions of higher education
that receive federal funding); see also Austin Smith, Subprime Goes to College, N.Y. POST
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to assess the academic quality of the institutions and programs for which it
provides federal funding.136
The link between federal funding of education and academic
accreditation originated with the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of
1952137 (known as the GI Bill).138 The GI Bill provided funding for
“thousands of [World War II] veterans to return to school.”139 Many
private educational institutions sprang up in response to the flood of federal
funds in the education industry.140 Because many of these private
institutions were of “questionable quality,” the government limited funding
eligibility to only those students enrolled at institutions accredited by
recognized accreditation bodies.141 The government chose to rely on
accreditation as a check on institutional quality rather than develop its own
system of quality review.142 Accreditation thus became the key to the
government’s funds, sparking an increase in the number of institutions
seeking accreditation.143
4. Regulating Accreditation
Given the responsibility of accrediting agencies of evaluating educational
quality and indirectly controlling the distribution of federal funds, these
agencies must be held accountable for their decisions.144 This section
addresses two important checks on accrediting bodies: the competitive
market and the government.145
a. The Competitive Market
First, the marketplace for public confidence plays a role in holding
accrediting agencies accountable for their decisions.146 Public confidence
in the accrediting agency’s seal of approval is essential to its continued
survival.147 If an accrediting agency loses public trust, institutions will
choose other accrediting agencies to evaluate their quality.

(June 6, 2010, 4:28 AM), http://nypost.com/2010/06/06/subprime-goes-to-college/. For a
full discussion of Title IV federal funding, see supra Part I.A.
136. See EATON, supra note 95, at 18 (noting that federal and state funds are often
contingent on an institution’s accredited status). The relationship between state governments
and accrediting agencies is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses only on Title IV
federal funding.
137. Pub. L. No. 82-550, 66 Stat. 663.
138. See Powell, supra note 88, at 57–58; see also BROWN, supra note 90, at 2–3.
139. See Powell, supra note 88, at 57–58.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Brittingham, supra note 93, at 13 (discussing the history and development of
accreditation).
143. See id. at 13–14.
144. See Wergin, supra note 106, at 27–28.
145. See id. at 28.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 27–28.
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Though the threat of competition among accreditors is theoretically a
check on accrediting agencies’ power, many argue that accrediting agencies
have formed a cartel148 that insulates them from the influence of the
competitive market.149 The government has maintained this cartel by
recognizing only a limited number of accreditors.150 This is particularly
true for regional accreditors, who have divided the country into regional
cartels, virtually eliminating an institution’s ability to choose another
accreditor.151 Therefore, the competitive market is not necessarily an
effective regulator of accreditation.
b. Government Regulation
Second, the federal government regulates accrediting agencies through
the HEA.152 Accrediting agencies and the government have had a long and
increasingly complicated relationship.153 Institutional independence and
autonomy have always been the mark of U.S. higher education.154 In recent
years, however, the government has been exercising increased control over
accrediting agencies.155
The goal of this regulation is to reconcile the tension between the
government’s traditional hands-off approach to education and the desire to
confirm that federal funds are only distributed to quality institutions. The
HEA seeks to ensure that the accrediting agencies responsible for
monitoring the quality of higher education are legitimate organizations
capable of determining which institutions are worthy of federal funds.156

148. A cartel is defined as “[a]n association of firms with common interests, seeking to
prevent extreme or unfair competition, allocate markets, or share knowledge.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 243 (9th ed. 2009).
149. See Jane S. Shaw, Breaking the Barriers to Entry, JOHN WILLIAM POPE CTR. FOR
HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/
article.html?id=2764; see also Anne D. Neal, Seeking Higher-Ed Accountability: Ending
Federal Accreditation, CHANGE MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 24.
150. See Shaw, supra note 149.
151. See Neal, supra note 149, at 27.
152. Higher Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1070–99 (1988)).
153. See Brittingham, supra note 93, at 14–16.
154. See Leah K. Matthews, Toward Institutional Autonomy or Nationalization? A Case
Study of the Federal Role in U.S. Higher Education Accreditation 7 (Apr. 30, 2012)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University) (on file with Fordham Law
Review).
155. See Powell, supra note 88, at 60; see also Wergin, supra note 106, at 28–29 (noting
that the USDE has become “far more intrusive in the past decade”). Given the increased
amount of student loan debt and the federal investment in the higher education system, the
government wants to ensure that it is providing funding only to quality institutions. See
supra Part I.A. The government is seeking to prevent the creation of diploma mills, forprofit institutions that continue to accept federal funding without ever providing any value to
students. See Wergin, supra note 106, at 29.
156. See Judith S. Eaton, What Future for Accreditation: The Challenge and Opportunity
of the Accreditation-Federal Government Relationship, in INQUIRY, EVIDENCE, AND
EXCELLENCE: THE PROMISE AND PRACTICE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE, supra note 106, at 77,
79.
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Two of the most significant forms of government regulation of accrediting
agencies are (i) the process of recognition and (ii) governance regulations.
i. Recognition
Recognition is the main process by which the government regulates
accrediting agencies.157 Through recognition, the USDE “scrutinizes and
judges accrediting organizations . . . for their capacity to serve as these
reliable authorities” on the quality of higher education for the purpose of
receiving funds under the HEA.158 Recognition is essentially a means of
accrediting the accreditors.159 The secretary of education periodically
publishes a list of recognized agencies in the Federal Register, giving the
public and higher education institutions notice of which accrediting
agencies have government approval.160
While accreditation is strictly a nongovernmental activity, recognition is
a product of government regulation under the HEA.161 Though the HEA is
very general in its standards for recognition, it delegates authority to the
USDE and the secretary of education to promulgate regulations establishing
specific criteria for recognition.162 These regulations provide (i) detailed
eligibility requirements for agencies seeking recognition, (ii) substantive
and procedural controls over agencies’ accreditation processes, and
(iii) procedural requirements for the recognition process.
First, the regulations establish the eligibility requirements for agencies
seeking recognition. An agency seeking recognition must establish the
scope of its accrediting activities, including the geographic area and degree
level it will accredit.163 The agency must also show that it: (1) granted
accreditation or preaccreditation164 to institutions; or (2) conducted
accrediting activities for at least two years prior to seeking recognition.165
Similarly, the agency must demonstrate that its standards and procedures
for accreditation are widely accepted by educators, institutions, licensing
bodies, or employers.166 These and other eligibility requirements indicate
that accrediting agencies must have an established reputation before seeking
accreditation.

157. See id. CHEA also regulates accrediting agencies through an independent
recognition process. See supra note 111. CHEA recognition, though valuable for building
public confidence, is not relevant to the distribution of federal funds.
158. See Eaton, supra note 156, at 79.
159. See EATON, supra note 94, at 9; see also BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 6.
160. 34 C.F.R. § 602.2(a) (2013).
161. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b (2012).
162. Id. § 1099b(a).
163. 34 C.F.R. §§ 602.11–.12.
164. Preaccreditation is defined as the status an accrediting agency grants to an institution
for a limited time, signifying that the institution is “progressing towards accreditation and is
likely to attain accreditation before the expiration of that limited period of time.” 34 C.F.R.
§ 602.3.
165. Id. § 602.12.
166. Id. § 602.13.
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Second, the HEA and USDE regulations establish substantive
requirements for a recognized accrediting agency’s accrediting process.
The HEA requires that accrediting agencies establish criteria for
institutional or programmatic accreditation that include an “appropriate
measure . . . of student achievement.”167 The agency seeking recognition
must consistently apply standards that “respect the stated mission of the
institution of higher education . . . and that ensure that the courses or
programs of instruction . . . are of sufficient quality to achieve . . . the stated
objective.”168 The HEA instructs accrediting agencies to evaluate higher
education institutions’ fulfillment of their stated missions, as discussed in
Part I.B.2.
While accrediting agencies are largely free to create their own
substantive criteria for assessing institutions, the HEA provides general
guidelines that the agencies must follow.169 Accrediting agencies must
assess ten features of an institution, including student achievement,
curricula, faculty, facilities, fiscal and administrative capacity, student
support services, and admissions processes.170
The agency must also develop a system of review to show its standards
are adequate and comprehensive.171 These guidelines provide very basic
requirements of an accrediting agency’s assessment process.172 Agencies
are required to assess the curricula, faculty, and student support services,
but the HEA does not provide guidance as to how to measure any of these
qualities.173
Third, the HEA and USDE regulations establish procedural requirements
for applying the substantive standards of the accrediting process.174 An
agency seeking recognition must demonstrate that it evaluates whether an
institution has achieved educational objectives “consistent with its
mission.”175 The agency must require institutions to engage in a self-study
process and conduct at least one on-site review.176 After generating its own
report about the institution’s self-analysis, the agency can make an
accreditation decision.177

167. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a).
168. Id. § 1099b(a)(4)(A).
169. Id. § 1099b(a)(5).
170. Id. (listing all ten aspects of a higher education institution that accrediting bodies
consider).
171. 34 C.F.R. § 602.21.
172. See id.
173. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b.
174. Another key procedural regulation is the requirement that all accrediting agency
procedures satisfy due process. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.25. This due process requirement
subjects agency decisions to judicial review and is the subject of extensive legislation that is
beyond the scope of this Note. For an overview of due process and accreditation, see
generally Michael W. Prairie & Lori A. Chamberlain, Due Process in the Accreditation
Context, 21 J.C. & U.L. 61 (1994).
175. 34 C.F.R. § 602.17.
176. Id.
177. Id. The agency must also have established controls to ensure that its standards are
applied consistently throughout this process. Id. § 602.18.
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In addition to the eligibility, substantive, and procedural requirements
outlined as part of the recognition process of government regulation, the
HEA and USDE regulations control the application process for
recognition.178 This process mirrors the accreditation process the agency
undertakes in reviewing institutions. First, the agency seeking recognition
submits an application to the USDE including evidence of its compliance
with the substantive and procedural requirements of the accreditation
process discussed above.179 The USDE may conduct site visits of the
accrediting agency and observe the accreditors’ on-site visits to institutions
or during accreditation meetings.180
After the USDE reviews the accrediting agency’s application for
recognition, it makes a recommendation and submits all application
materials to the NACIQI.181 Accrediting agencies and third parties are free
to make presentations at NACIQI meetings.182 After NACIQI makes a
recommendation to the secretary, the USDE make a final decision about the
recognition status of an accrediting agency.183
ii. Governance Standards
In addition to the regulations related to recognition, the HEA and USDE
regulations control the governance and organizational structure of
accrediting agencies. These governance standards require that accrediting
agencies be “separate and independent.”184 “Separate and independent”
accrediting agencies must establish rules to avoid conflicts of interests, have
a certain proportion of public members on their decisionmaking bodies, and
meet certain other requirements.185 However, 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(d)
provides an exception to these independence requirements for any agencies
recognized prior to October 1, 1991.186

178. The recognition process described here applies to initial recognition. An agency that
has already been recognized by the USDE may apply for continued recognition when it is
time for periodic review (every five years), or when the scope of its accrediting activity has
changed. See Accreditation in the U.S., supra note 119. The differences between these
recognition processes are beyond the scope of this Note.
179. 34 C.F.R. § 602.31.
180. See National Recognition of Accrediting Agencies by the U.S. Secretary of
Education, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_
pg3.html (last modified Feb. 12, 2014).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. Despite this extensively regulated process, critics argue that recognition does
little to police accreditors as none of the six USDE-recognized regional accreditors has ever
lost recognition. See, e.g., Sarah Molinero, Note, Reexamining the Examiners: The Need for
Increased Government Regulation of Accreditation in Higher Education, 51 DUQ. L. REV.
833, 857 (2013).
184. 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(a)(1)(iii).
185. Id. § 602.14(b).
186. Id. § 602.14(d). In addition to being recognized since 1991, these accrediting bodies
must show that (i) related trade associations play no role in their decisionmaking policies,
(ii) such trade associations do not receive any nonpublic information, and (iii) the agency has
“sufficient budgetary and administrative autonomy” to independently accredit schools. Id.
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II. ECONOMIC THEORIES
Part I of this Note discussed the intertwining institutional frameworks of
the federal student loan program and accreditation. Part II discusses two
economic theories that are at the core of the federal funding-accreditation
dilemma: (A) agency costs and (B) principles of valuation. These theories
help to explain why the USDE and accreditors differ in their approaches to
evaluating education.
A. Agency Theory
First, agency theory helps to explain the relationship between the USDE
and accreditors. This section addresses (1) the general economic principles
of agency theory and agency costs, (2) how agency theory manifests in
different contexts, and (3) how principals can regulate agents to reduce
agency costs.
1. Agency Theory Generally
Agency theory is an economic theory that is defined as the “analytic
expression of the contractual relationship of two (or more) parties, in which
one party, designated as the principal, engages another party, designated as
the agent, to perform some service on behalf of the principal.”187 This
theory reflects that idea that the principal and agent, though acting as
cooperating parties, may have different goals and interests that cause the
agent to act in a way that does not serve the principal’s needs.188
A principal-agent relationship may cause an “agency problem” or impose
“agency costs” when (1) the principal and agent have divergent interests
and (2) the principal has difficulty assessing the agent’s actions.189
Divergent interests occur when the desires or goals of the principal and
agent conflict.190 Agency theory rests on the assumption that actors—
whether individuals, governments, firms, or organizations—act in their own
self-interest to fulfill their own desires.191
These divergent interests only impose agency costs on the principal,
however, if the principal cannot verify or assess the agent’s actions.192 If
the information available to both the principal and agent is identical, the
principal can perfectly monitor the agent’s actions and identify and rectify
an agent’s opportunistic behavior.193 However, information asymmetries
187. Jussi Kivisto, The Government–Higher Education Institution Relationship:
Theoretical Considerations From the Perspective of Agency Theory, 11 TERTIARY EDUC. &
MGMT. 1, 1 (2005).
188. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989).
189. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 1–2.
190. See id.
191. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59, 64. For organizations and firms, it can
additionally be assumed that there is “partial goal conflict among participants,” suggesting
that there is an internal divergence of interests as well. Id. at 59.
192. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 1–2.
193. See id.
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make it difficult for the principal to monitor and assess an agent’s
behavior.194
2. Agency Theory in Different Contexts
Agency theory is often discussed in the context of the corporate
structure.195 Corporations are faced with an agency problem because they
are owned by one group of people—shareholders—and managed by another
group of people—directors—who may have different ideas about how the
corporation should operate.196 Though this shareholder-manager dilemma
is considered the archetypal principal-agent scenario, agency theory can be
applied in circumstances in which the interests at stake change,197 including
government outsourcing198 and the nonprofit sector.199
First, principals and agents in the government context have additional
behavioral influences that affect their decisions.200 The government often
relies on private actors or government agencies to create regulatory
standards.201 Principals and agents in this situation are faced with political
influences that affect the self-interested choices they make.202 Parties have
additional constituents and strategies to consider in making their
decisions.203 The impact of these constituents must be considered when
evaluating the divergent interests of the principal and agent.
Second, the nonprofit sector also presents unique challenges for
principal-agent relationships. Often the government acts as a principal in
relationships with an agent nonprofit organization.204 The principal
(government) seeks to maximize the services received by the nonprofit

194. See id.
195. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59 (discussing the influential articles exploring
agency theory in the corporate context); see also Eleanor Brown, Donors, Ideologues, and
Bureaucrats: The Principal-Agent Relationship Between Government and the Nonprofit
Sector 1 (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
196. In the corporate context, shareholder owners are not able to “perfectly monitor the
behavior of managers.” See Brown, supra note 195, at 1. Therefore, shareholders cannot
always correct behavior that deviates from the shareholders’ interests, creating agency costs.
197. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 57 (noting that agency theory has been used by
scholars in accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organizational
behavior, and sociology); see also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 2.
198. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE
L.J. 389 (2003) (discussing how the government’s reliance on private firms to regulate
industries implicates agency theory).
199. See generally Brown, supra note 195 (discussing the tension between donors,
managers, and the government in the nonprofit sector).
200. See Shapiro, supra note 198, at 416–17 (discussing political influences on principal
and agent behavior).
201. See id. at 406–07 (“An agency’s reliance on private actors to write regulatory
standards creates agency problems.”).
202. See id. at 416–17 (discussing that the decision to employ private firms may involve
political influences).
203. See id.
204. See Brown, supra note 195, at 1 (considering “the role of government as principal
and the nonprofit sector as a set of agents from whom, collectively, the government wants to
maximize service provision”).
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organization, typically the provision of consumption goods and services.205
Just as the government actor must consider political effects of its decisions,
nonprofit agents often consider ideological interests.206 The principal may
have different ideologies that cause a rift between the principal and
agent.207
Both the government and nonprofit relationships present the possibility
of “dual agency” or the “compounded agency” problem.208 Compounded
agency addresses the complexity of multiple, simultaneous conflicts of
interest in relationships.209 These complex scenarios often arise in the
context of public-private partnerships.210 In these relationships, a public
organization (e.g., a government agency) acts as agent for the public
consumers.211 The public organization, as agent for the public, hires a
private actor—a for-profit or nonprofit organization—to perform a service
for the public actor.212 This private actor is therefore an agent to the public
actor and also an indirect agent for public consumers.213 These complex
relationships increase the risk of divergent interests and information
asymmetries.214
3. Reducing Agency Costs
When a principal-agent relationship imposes agency costs on the
principal, the principal can take certain steps to motivate the agent to
behave in accordance with the principal’s interests and thus reduce these
costs.215 Positivist agency theory involves (1) identifying situations in
which a principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and
(2) generating governance mechanisms that can limit the potential selfserving behavior of the agent.216 This section discusses two types of

205. See id. These goods and services range from food and shelter to healthcare and
education. See id. at 2–3. In addition to provision of services, the government also looks to
the nonprofit sector to “safeguard certain basic liberties and freedoms.” Id. at 2.
206. See id. at 5 (discussing the concern that donors only donate to nonprofits when there
is a “good ideological match” between their ideology and the nonprofit’s purpose).
207. See id. (discussing ideological matches).
208. See Jeff W. Trailer et al., A Compounded Agency Problem: An Empirical
Examination of Public-Private Partnerships, 5 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. CAMBRIDGE 308, 308
(2004).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. (discussing that there are “[m]ultiple, conflicting goals [that] inherently exist”
in these relationships).
215. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 58 (“[T]he focus of [agency] theory is on
determining the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship.”); see
also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 7–8 (discussing the contract options that balance the
tradeoffs of measuring behavior and measuring outcomes).
216. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59.
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governance
mechanisms—behavior-based
and
outcome-based
monitoring—and when each type of governance is most effective.217
Behavior-based monitoring focuses on reducing the informational
asymmetries that exist between the principal and agent.218 Reducing
information asymmetries allows the principal to detect and correct the
agent’s self-serving behavior.219 Behavior-based monitoring may involve
developing reporting structures, supervising budgeting systems, or using
boards of directors to oversee agents’ activities.220
Outcome-based evaluations focus on reducing the conflicts of interest
between principals and agents.221 These evaluations tie the agent’s reward
to certain outcomes, aligning the preferences of the agent with those of the
principal.222
The benefits of behavior-based monitoring and outcome-based
evaluations depend on the principal-agent relationship and the nature of the
task the agent is performing. Principals deciding whether to use outcomebased or behavior-based governance mechanisms to reduce agency costs
should consider the extent to which (i) the principal’s and agent’s goals
conflict, (ii) the agent’s task is programmable, (iii) the outcome is
uncertain, and (iv) the outcome is measurable.223
First, goal conflict assessment considers how divergent the parties’ goals
and interests are.224 If there is a major conflict between the principal and
agent’s goals, outcome-based evaluations tend to be more appropriate and
the principal should attempt to align the agent’s incentives to its desired
outcomes.225
Second, task programmability evaluates the degree to which the agent’s
behaviors can be specified in advance.226 If a principal can easily dictate
the actions that the agent must take to achieve the principal’s goal, then
behavior-based governance may be more appropriate.227
Third, outcome uncertainty measures the extent to which the outcome
depends on the agent’s work versus how much the outcome depends on the
external environment.228 If the agent’s work has little connection to the

217. See id. at 60 (noting that principals must determine the “optimal contract, behavior
versus outcome”); see also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 6.
218. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 6.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59–60.
222. See id.; see also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 6.
223. These four factors are a nonexhaustive list. Other factors that can be taken into
consideration include the nature of the agency relationship and the risk aversion of the
parties. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 8–12; see also Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 61–62.
224. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 11.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 10–11.
227. See id. at 11.
228. See id. at 9.
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outcome, it is “not reasonable to base the contract on outcomes.”229 Thus,
behavior-based mechanisms are more appropriate in these situations.230
Finally, outcome measurability refers to the ease with which a principal
can measure the agent’s productivity or success in completing an assigned
task.231 In deciding if an outcome is measurable, principals should consider
if outcomes could be defined and effectively measured.232 Generally, when
outcomes are easily measured, the task lends itself to outcome-based
evaluation mechanisms.233
Although these four factors are considerations in determining the
effectiveness of outcome-based and behavior-based governance, there are
drawbacks to both forms of monitoring. Both types of governance
mechanisms increase measurement costs, namely, the cost of monitoring
and evaluating the other party in a transaction.234 Principals must consider
these costs in deciding to employ governance mechanisms.235
The relationships described with respect to federal student loans and
accreditation in Part I.A and I.B, respectively, present an agency problem.
This agency problem is discussed further in Part III of this Note.
B. Principles of Valuation
Assessing a principal-agent relationship using the four factors described
above often involves measuring and valuing the activities and goals of both
the principal and agent. This section addresses (1) the subjective theory of
value and (2) proposed methods to value education, both of which
illuminate the government-accreditor agency relationship and the potential
solutions to this particularly problematic agency relationship.
1. The Subjective Theory of Value
According to the subjective theory of value,236 a good or service’s value
depends on the utility that good or service provides to the individual
consumer, rather than any objective or intrinsic quality of the good or
service itself.237 “Utility” is the economic term for the “satisfaction an

229. Id. When there are a variety of external factors that can influence outcomes,
outcome-based contracts are unattractive because the outcome will not necessarily reflect the
agent’s actions. Id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 8.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See Shapiro, supra note 198, at 393–95.
235. See id.
236. The Austrian School of Economics first proposed the subjective theory of value.
THOMAS C. TAYLOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 40 (1980). This theory
soon replaced the labor theory in mainstream economics. See infra note 237.
237. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 40 (“[Value] does not reside objectively and
intrinsically in the things themselves, apart from the individual who is making an
evaluation.”). The notion that a good’s value is not based on its inherent qualities is opposed
by the labor theory of value. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal
Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305, 352 (1993). According to the labor theory of value, a
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individual actor derives from achieving an end.”238 The subjective theory
of value holds that measuring this utility is problematic because of its
subjective nature.239 Individuals have different preferences and derive
various amounts of satisfaction from different goods.240 Individuals rank
their choices and seek the alternative that maximizes their utility.241
In evaluating how an individual ranks her choices among goods and
services, the subjective theory of value focuses on the principle of
diminishing marginal utility.242 According to this principle, the value of an
additional unit of a good provides less utility than the preceding unit of that
good.243
The existence of individual subjective hierarchies of goods and the
principle of diminishing marginal utility explain pricing in the market.244
The individual, subjective evaluations of goods and services in the market
affect both the supply and demand of goods.245 These subjective
preferences affect the amount of money that consumers allocate to goods
and services, thus determining price.246

good’s value is “a function of that which [was] invested” in producing the good. Id.
Subjective value theory replaced the labor theory in mainstream economics during the
“marginalist revolution” of the 1870s. Leland Yeager, Why Subjectivism?, 1 REV. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 5, 15 (1987). Further analysis of the labor theory of value is beyond the scope of this
Note.
238. Joseph Becker, Procrustean Jurisprudence: An Austrian School Economic Critique
of the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in the Twentieth Century United States, 15 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 693–94 (1995).
239. Id. at 694.
240. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 40–41 (“The extent to which a thing gives
satisfaction is always personal.”).
241. See Alexander Tabarrok, Subjective Value Theory: A Reformulation, AUSTRIAN
ECON. NEWSL. (The Ludwig von Mises Inst., Auburn, Ala.), Fall 1990, at 6. The concept of
“utility” or “satisfaction” is often incorrectly equated with happiness in the context of the
subjective theory of value. Id. Utility is independent of human emotions; humans may make
choices based on their values that do not necessarily make them happier. Id.
242. See Becker, supra note 238, at 694–95.
243. See id. Diminishing marginal utility and the subjective theory of value explain the
“water-diamond paradox” in economics: why water, though essential to human life, has a
lower price than diamonds. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 41–44. Given the scarcity of
diamonds and the relative abundance of water, the principle of diminishing marginal utility
dictates that the next unit of water will be devoted to a use of lesser importance. See id.
These prices would change if an individual were faced with the choice between all water and
all diamonds in existence; however the subjective theory of value focuses on a definite
amount of goods rather than the whole category of goods. See id.
244. See Tabarrok, supra note 241, at 7 (stating that the purpose of subjective value
theory is to explain prices).
245. See Yeager, supra note 237, at 15 (noting that “subjective factors operate on both
sides” of supply and demand).
246. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 48.

1932

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

2. Methods of Valuing Education
Despite the subjective theory of value, education experts in government,
accreditation, and the private sector try to value “quality higher
education.”247 Many applaud the benefits of education—increasing skilled
workers, promoting American competitiveness in technological
development, increasing participation in democratic society248—but how
are these benefits quantified?249 Should universities be assessed for quality
at the institutional level, programmatic level, or class level?250
Ultimately, there is no “generally accepted understanding” of what a
quality higher education entails.251 This section addresses competing
theories for how education should be valued: (a) a financial perspective;
(b) measuring inputs; (c) measuring outputs; and (d) comprehensive rating
systems.
a. Financial Valuation of Education
First, a purely financial valuation of education focuses on the student’s
financial costs and benefits of attending higher education.252 A student’s
decision to seek higher education is therefore based on a comparison of the
present discounted value of benefits and the present discounted value of the
cost of attending.253 Benefits are measured by the gains in future
earnings,254 while costs include tuition, fees, and foregone wages.255

247. Despite the repeated attempts to value education, some suggest that a common
standard of valuation would destroy the “diversity of opinion about what a college education
means,” which has “been seen as a strength of American higher education.” See, e.g., Doug
Lederman, What Degrees Should Mean, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/25/defining_what_a_college_degree_recipien
t_should_know_and_be_able_to_do (suggesting that commonality among educational
standards should not be the goal).
248. For a discussion of the benefits of higher education, see supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
249. See Wergin, supra note 106, at 27 (discussing the “quality conundrum”).
250. See GEORGE C. LEEF & ROXANA D. BURRIS, AM. COUNCIL OF TRS. & ALUMNI, CAN
COLLEGE ACCREDITATION LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISE? 7, 18–19 (2002), available at
http://www.chea.org/pdf/CanAccreditationFulfillPromise.pdf.
251. See Lederman, supra note 247 (quoting Jamie P. Merisotis, president and chief
executive officer of the Lumina Foundation, who suggests that this undefined concept of
“quality” has frustrated policymakers, employers, and students). But see Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Assessing Value and Opportunity in Higher Educ. (Sept. 20, 2013),
available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/assessing-value-and-opportunity-highereducation (rejecting “the idea that the value of a college education is so elusive, so
inexpressible that no ratings system can ever meaningfully help consumers determine its
value”).
252. See Avery & Turner, supra note 64, at 172–77 (discussing education using an
investment analysis).
253. See id. at 172.
254. See id. A college degree is estimated to provide an 84 percent income premium. See
CARNEVALE ET AL., supra note 65, at 1.
255. See Avery & Turner, supra note 64, at 172.
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This valuation methodology is criticized because it fails to consider the
“substantial variation” in these metrics from student to student.256
Students’ costs and benefits vary depending on a number of factors,
including their success in completing school and their choice of
occupation.257 Critics claim that this method is oversimplified and fails to
consider individual differences, the difficulty of predicting costs and
benefits, and nonfinancial and intangible benefits of education.258
b. Input Valuation
Second, some suggest valuing schools based on their educational inputs,
such as the facilities and capacity of the school.259 Accrediting agencies
have traditionally focused on inputs when assessing quality and have
assumed that a school with proper inputs and processes provides acceptable
quality education.260 The American Council of Trustees and Alumni
(ACTA), skeptical of using inputs to measure quality, has compared this
methodology to a car inspection: “If the accrediting process were applied to
automobile inspections, cars would ‘pass’ as long as they had tires, doors,
and an engine—without anyone ever turning the key to see if the car
actually operated.”261 Critics of this method, including ACTA, argue that
inputs have a “dubious link to student performance, skill acquisition, and
employability,” and therefore do not reflect quality of education.262
c. Output Valuation
Those who criticize input valuation may prefer that educational quality
be measured by student outputs. Assessing quality based on outputs could
involve measuring tangible statistical data or measuring learning outcomes.
Statistical data may include graduation rates, employment rates, and
graduate earnings.263 These measurements are criticized for the same
reasons financial valuations fail to assess quality: they vary widely by
student and fail to capture the intangible benefits of education.264
In addition to statistical outcomes, some encourage assessing quality
based on more flexible student outcomes. For example, the Lumina
Foundation has developed a Degree Qualification Profile to assess learning

256. Id. at 177.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 7, 18–19; see also BURKE & BUTLER, supra
note 92, at 8–9.
260. See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 7.
261. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 9 (quoting AM. COUNCIL TRUSTEES &
ALUMNI, WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK AND WHAT POLICYMAKERS CAN DO ABOUT
IT 6 (2007), available at http://www.goacta.org/images/download/why_accreditation_
doesnt_work.pdf).
262. See id. at 8–9.
263. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 251.
264. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
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outcomes as a reflection of educational quality.265 This profile seeks to set
minimum standards for qualified schools at different degree levels in five
areas of learning:
applied learning, intellectual skills, specialized
knowledge, broad integrative knowledge, and civic learning.266 These
measurements escape the inflexibility of the financial valuations; however,
the Lumina Profile and other student learning outcome methodologies are
very fluid concepts that could be interpreted in many different ways by the
evaluator.267
d. Comprehensive Rating Systems
Finally, comprehensive rating systems seek to combine the
methodologies of financial, input, and output valuation. The USDE has
proposed a composite rating system that would compare similar institutions
based on their access, affordability, and outcomes.268 As of the writing of
this Note, the USDE is soliciting feedback from industry experts as to
which factors it should consider in measuring “quality.”269
Government’s venture into school ratings has troubled some industry
experts. Some fear that this rating system will focus too much on
outcomes, thus discounting schools that produce public servants, teachers,
and military members who earn less money but provide a significant social
benefit.270
Debate over the comprehensive rating system and the varying opinions
for measuring “quality” education evince a tension in the higher education
industry: how do you enforce accountability among higher education
institutions and accreditors if you cannot agree on an intended outcome?271
III. THE FUNDING-ACCREDITATION DILEMMA & PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Analyzed in light of the economic theories discussed in Part II of this
Note, the accreditation industry and federal student loan program discussed
in Part I are fraught with structural flaws. Part III first discusses the
funding-accreditation dilemma in general. It then addresses the principalagent relationship that exists between the government and accreditors.
Finally, it considers five proposed solutions to remedy the principal-agent
problem and structural flaws of the accreditation-federal funding system.

265. See generally LUMINA FOUND. FOR EDUC., THE DEGREE QUALIFICATIONS PROFILE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.luminafoundation.org/publications/The_Degree_
Qualifications_Profile.pdf.
266. See id. at 18–20.
267. See Powell, supra note 88, at 66.
268. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 251.
269. See id.
270. See id.; see also BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 2 (suggesting that “federal
scorecards” be avoided to allow market forces to determine quality).
271. See Lederman, supra note 247.
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A. The Funding-Accreditation Dilemma Generally
Accreditation was formerly a voluntary process used to ensure the quality
of higher education through a peer-review process that allowed schools to
distinguish themselves and earn public trust.272 When the government tied
accreditation to federal funding, using accreditation as a “proxy for
quality,” it made accreditation a de facto requirement for all institutions.273
The federal student loan crisis has brought the role of accreditation as a
primary gatekeeper for federal loans under intense scrutiny.274 Despite
accreditation’s gatekeeping role, loan balances are skyrocketing, defaults
are increasing, and students are being overburdened with debt.275
One of the key reasons accreditation has been ineffective as a gatekeeper
is because the relationships among the many players in the higher education
industry generate agency costs.276 The accreditation-federal funding
system is riddled with conflicts of interest and divergent incentives,
stemming mostly from conflicting views over how to define a “quality”
education.277 The government has been increasing its involvement in
accreditation in an attempt to impose accountability and reduce these
agency costs.278 However, debate still remains as to whether the
government has been effective in its attempt to impose accountability or
whether government involvement in education is limiting institutional
autonomy.
B. Government and Accreditors: A Principal-Agent Relationship
In the higher education federal funding system discussed above, a
principal-agent relationship exists between the government and
accreditors.279 As discussed in Part II.A of this Note, agency costs exist
when a principal hires an agent to perform a service and the principal and
agent (1) have divergent interests and (2) do not have equal access to
information.280 This section analyzes the divergent incentives and
information asymmetries between the government and accreditors.

272. See supra Part I.B.
273. See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 2.
274. See supra Part I.A.
275. See id.
276. See infra Part III.B.
277. See infra Part III.B.
278. See Eaton, supra note 96, at 12–13 (discussing the increasing role of government
regulation in accreditation).
279. See Matthews, supra note 154, at 25–26. There are other principal-agent
relationships in this industry that contribute to the system’s ineffectiveness but are beyond
the scope of this Note. For example, the government can be viewed as a principal that uses
the schools as agents to educate the public. Accrediting agencies are also viewed as agents
for the public (both directly, and indirectly through their accountability to the federal
government). This Note focuses only on the principal-agent relationship between the
government and accreditors.
280. See supra Part II.A.1.
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The government principal has authorized the agent accreditors to carry
out quality assurance on its behalf;281 however, these accreditors,
accountable to many constituents, do not necessarily evaluate schools with
government interests in mind.282 The “inherent contradictions” between the
government and accreditors have led to inconsistent standards that
contribute to the ineffectiveness of accreditation’s gatekeeping.283 The
government and accrediting bodies have divergent interests with respect to
the funding-accreditation dilemma: while the government focuses on
external accountability, accreditors focus more on quality improvement.284
The government is focused on accountability and wants to ensure that
billions of dollars of federal student loans are only distributed to quality
institutions.285 The USDE’s proposed federal scorecard plan to rate
colleges reflects the government’s concern with the access, affordability,
and outcomes of higher education.286 The government’s ultimate concern
is consumer protection and financial accountability—including loan
repayment.287 The USDE wants accreditation to play this “consumer
protection role,” which would involve providing instant information,
quantitative standards, and bright-line judgments in assessing educational
quality.288 The government seeks “public confidence, quality, and
transparency,” rather than the peer-review process that has been the
hallmark of accreditation.289
In addition to the government’s interest in controlling the use of its
federal loans, the government has multiple constituents to which it is
accountable.290 As discussed in Part II.A.2, government actors in principalagent relationships are faced with political pressure, public opinion, and
lobbyists.291 Thus, the government may be influenced by competing
pressures to increase college enrollment and lower tuition.292
While the government is focused on accountability, accrediting bodies
are focused on assessment and quality improvement.293 Accreditors do not

281. See Matthews, supra note 154, at 25 (discussing that the HEA made the governmentaccreditation relationship “take on the qualities of a principal-agent dynamic”).
282. See id. at 25–26.
283. See Powell, supra note 88, at 66–67.
284. Victor M.H. Borden, The Accountability/Improvement Paradox, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/04/30/borden (discussing the
tension between “the academy’s internally driven efforts . . . to improve their programs and
practices, and calls for accountability by various policy bodies representing the ‘consuming
public’”).
285. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 251.
286. See id.
287. See Eaton, supra note 156, at 82–83.
288. See id.
289. See Powell, supra note 88, at 67–68.
290. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the additional complexities of principal-agent
relationships involving the government).
291. See supra Part II.A.2.
292. See, e.g., Roots, supra note 4, at 504–05 (discussing that the HEA was enacted to
increase access to higher education for Americans); McGuire, supra note 20, at 119–21.
293. See EATON, supra note 94, at 1.
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see their role as a consumer protection advocate.294 Accreditors have
focused on a more nuanced system of quality review that involves working
with institutions to improve their processes.295 While a consumer
protection role would require accreditors to be accountable to those outside
the education industry, the peer-review, self-regulating accreditation
industry operates as though it is accountable to the higher education
community.296 Accreditors want to focus on institutional autonomy and
academic freedom;297 however, regulators pressure accreditors to focus
more on learning outcomes and standards.298
The accreditation industry’s interest in the quality of education
necessarily includes that education be separate from government
interference.299 Accreditors are concerned that increasing government
involvement could lead to the USDE acting as a “co-accreditor,”
challenging accrediting bodies’ decisions and increasing control over the
assessment process.300
In addition to quality improvement, accrediting bodies have an interest in
maintaining collegiality in the higher education industry for both
reputational and financial reasons.301 First, there is a “high degree of
collegiality in the [accreditation] process” because teams that evaluate
schools are generally composed of faculty from other colleges and
universities in the region—the same colleges and universities that will then
be accredited by faculty of the school being assessed.302 Reviewing
committee members often know each other and have a desire to stay on
good terms with the repeat players in the process.303 Ultimately, these
reputational concerns incentivize accrediting bodies to approve
accreditation.304

294. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 152 (“[A]ccreditors themselves continue to insist that
their role is to evaluate educational institutions as educators, not to uphold the integrity of
the Title IV system.”); see also Eaton, supra note 156, at 83 (“Consumer protection is
important and valuable, but . . . not effectively met using accreditation as the vehicle to
achieve this goal.”).
295. See Eaton, supra note 156, at 82–83 (noting that accreditation is not meant to
provide bright-line rules or quantifiable standards).
296. See id. at 88.
297. See id. (discussing how the “fundamental features” of accreditation are
“incompatible” with the standardization imposed by external actors).
298. See Powell, supra note 88, at 60.
299. See generally COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, THE CHEA INITIATIVE
FINAL REPORT (2012), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/TheCHEAInitiative_Final_
Report8.pdf (discussing concerns about the imbalance in the public-private partnership
between the government and accreditors).
300. See id. at 6 (noting that government attempts to engage in academic judgments are
undesirable).
301. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 9.
302. See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 13–14.
303. See id. at 37–38.
304. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 9 (“[T]hese conflicts of interest have created
a system whereby accreditation agencies are inclined to protect the interests of existing
colleges and universities.”).
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In addition to reputational concerns, financial concerns make collegiality
a key interest of accreditors. Accrediting agencies are funded in large part
Withdrawing
by the colleges and universities that pay dues.305
accreditation would therefore limit the accrediting agencies’ funds, biasing
accrediting agencies in favor of approving accreditation.306
In addition to these divergent interests—public accountability versus
institutional assessment—there are information asymmetries between
accreditors and the government. The accreditors have knowledge about the
institutions they assess because of the long-term collegial relationships
formed with these institutions.307 This information is generally not publicly
available, as accreditors publish limited information about their
assessments.308 These information asymmetries and divergent interests
generate agency costs as the government attempts to regulate accreditors.
C. Proposals for Reform
Public debate about the effectiveness of the accreditation process and the
growing level of student loan debt have led to calls for reform of the
accreditation-funding relationship. The government monitors accrediting
agencies using a number of regulations discussed in Part I.B.4 of this
Note.309 Though these regulations attempt to align the incentives of
accrediting bodies and the government and thereby reduce agency costs,
they are largely ineffective in doing so.310 This section discusses several
proposals for modifying the accreditation and federal student loan
system.311

305. See id.
306. See id.; see also LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 37; McGuire, supra note 20, at
151–52 (discussing the pressure exerted upon accrediting agencies because of their financial
dependence on the institutions they oversee).
307. See supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text.
308. See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 39 (discussing that schools do not release
critical accreditation reviews).
309. See supra Part I.B.4.
310. The government’s primary form of control over accrediting bodies is the threat of
revoking recognition, which was discussed in Part I.B.4, supra; however, the government
has never revoked the recognition of the six regional accreditors, so this is an empty threat.
See supra note 183. Similarly, the substantive requirements accreditors must follow are
vague and leave much to the accrediting agencies’ discretion. See supra notes 167–70 and
accompanying text. Finally, the USDE-imposed governance standards are ineffective
because many accreditors are exempt from the requirements. See supra notes 184–86 and
accompanying text.
311. For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of these proposals, see infra Part IV.
In addition to these proposed changes to the relationship between accreditation and federal
funding, there are many ways that the accreditation industry and student loan system can be
independently modified to make them each more effective; however, this Note focuses only
on how the relationship between the two parties can be made more effective.
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1. Proposal One: Maintain the Status Quo
The first proposal is to keep the accreditation and federal funding
systems functioning as they are today. Those who feel that the rise in
student loan debts does not reflect a “crisis” often claim that increased debt
signals increased investment in the industry.312 If there is no “student loan
crisis,” there is no need to overhaul the system. Additionally, proponents of
the status quo suggest that the market for education is efficient: students
can differentiate between high and low quality institutions regardless of
government or accreditation involvement.313
2. Proposal Two: Change the Pay Structure
The second proposal is to change the pay structure of the accrediting
industry to cut the financial ties between higher education institutions and
the accrediting bodies. Because higher education institutions pay dues to
the accrediting bodies of which they are members, accrediting bodies have
an incentive to continue granting accreditation regardless of academic
quality.314 Cutting this tie and allowing the government to directly fund
accreditation could reduce this incentive and make the accrediting bodies
more accountable to the government.
3. Proposal Three: Define “Quality” Education
Third, the government could reform the accreditation-funding
relationship by specifically defining standards for how quality should be
assessed, increasing government regulation.315 In defining quality, the
government could employ any of the measures discussed above in Part
II.B.2.
One group of proponents for this reform suggests that the government
impose a common framework of quality assessment on accreditors that ties
quality to standard learning outcomes or student performance outcomes.316
This system could dictate how accreditors are to evaluate the institutions
they accredit.
Another group of proponents suggest a government definition of quality
that would supplement the existing accreditation system. The USDEproposed rating system seeks to create this accreditation supplement by
valuing education based on a number of factors.317
312. See supra notes 66, 85 (discussing the argument that the increase in student loan
debt is not a crisis or a bubble that could seriously affect the U.S. economy).
313. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 142–43 (rejecting the idea that students can evaluate
the quality of education before attending under the current regime).
314. See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text.
315. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 251 (proposing a
college rating system that would measure quality).
316. See, e.g., Molinero, supra note 183, at 855 (discussing commentators who argue for
“common degree framework” set by the government under which quality can be
standardized based on learning outcomes).
317. See supra Part II.B.2.

1940

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

4. Proposal Four: Encourage Competition Among Accreditors
The fourth proposal commonly suggested is that the government should
increase the number of recognized accrediting bodies.318 Recognizing more
accrediting bodies would break the current “accreditation monopoly.”319
This would show accreditors that they are not “too big to fail” and
incentivize them to follow government interests or face losing recognition
status.320
5. Proposal Five: Decouple Accreditation and Federal Student Loans
Finally, the fifth proposal for reform is to decouple the accreditation and
federal funding systems.321 Under this new system, accreditation would
continue to function as a private assessment tool, while the government
would provide Title IV funding to higher education institutions of its
choice, depending on any institutional requirements it may pass.
Each of these proposals has far-reaching effects on accreditation, the
government, higher education institutions, and the public. For the reasons
discussed in Part IV, decoupling accreditation and federal funding is the
best solution to address the agency costs that are inherent in the current
system.
IV. DECOUPLING ACCREDITATION AND
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS
The proposed solutions discussed in Part III of this Note attempt to
remedy the agency costs created by the current federal fundingaccreditation regime. Of these proposed solutions, decoupling the two
regimes is the best way to address the agency costs and flaws in the system,
ultimately returning autonomy to both accreditors and federal lenders.
Part IV first explains the failure of outcome-based and behavior-based
governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs. It then discusses why
decoupling accreditation and federal funding is the best solution to this
dilemma.
A. The Failure of Outcome-Based and
Behavior-Based Governance
As discussed in Part III of this Note, the relationship between the federal
student loan program and the accreditation industry creates agency costs
because of the divergent views of how educational quality should be
measured.322 Agency costs are often reduced using behavior-based or

318.
319.
320.
321.

See Molinero, supra note 183, at 857–58; see also Neal, supra note 149, at 29.
See Neal, supra note 149, at 29.
See Molinero, supra note 183, at 858.
See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 90, at 2; BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 2; LEEF &
BURRIS, supra note 250, at 49–50; Neal, supra note 149, at 28.
322. See supra Part III.B.
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outcome-based governance mechanisms.323 These governance mechanisms
align the parties’ incentives and increase the principal’s control over the
agent, ultimately reducing the agent’s self-serving behavior.324
There are four key factors that assess if behavior-based or outcome-based
monitoring is effective: goal conflict, task programmability, outcome
uncertainty, and outcome measurability.325 Evaluating these four factors in
the context of the federal funding-accreditation relationship suggests that
neither behavior-based nor outcome-based governance will be effective in
reducing agency costs as both forms of governance presuppose a more
defined goal.
First, there is a divisive conflict between the federal government and
accrediting agencies’ goals.326 Though both parties ultimately seek to
ensure quality education, the parties’ definitions of “quality” are
While the government is focused on external
incompatible.327
accountability and the consumer protection role of accreditation, accreditors
focus on quality improvement and collegiality in the industry.328 These
conflicting views of accreditation are exacerbated by the compounded
agency problem: public opinion, politicians, and lobbyists influence the
government, while educational institutions influence accreditors, creating a
web of conflicting interests and loyalties.329 These conflicting goals
suggest that outcome-based measurement would be a more appropriate
governance method.
Second, task programmability also suggests that outcome-based
evaluations would be more effective than behavior-based governance. If an
agent’s behavior cannot be easily specified in advance, behavior-based
monitoring is unlikely to be effective.330 Here, there are several reasons
why the task of accreditation is not programmable. If the government
dictated the process of accreditation, it would essentially become a
government function. Prescribing accreditation would be equivalent to
defining quality, allowing the government to regulate higher education.331
This would contradict the tradition of institutional independence that is the
cornerstone of higher education in the United States.332 Programming the
task of accreditation would violate these principles, suggesting that

323. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing positivist agency theory).
324. See supra Part II.A.3.
325. See supra Part II.A.3.
326. See supra notes 282–306 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 282–306 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 282–306 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 200–14 and accompanying text (discussing compounded agency
problems in general); see also supra Part III.B (discussing how the compounded agency
problem manifests in the government-accreditor relationship).
330. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
331. Judith S. Eaton, The Future of Accreditation?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 24, 2008),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/03/24/eaton#ixzz2nmxJ8100.
332. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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behavior-based governance is an inappropriate manner of addressing
agency costs.333
Third, a consideration of outcome uncertainty suggests that neither
outcome-based nor behavior-based monitoring would be effective because
no outcome has been specified. If an agent’s work has little connection to
the desired outcome, behavior-based mechanisms are more appropriate than
outcome-based governance.334 The government’s desired outcome is
ensuring that its billions of dollars are invested in quality institutions;
however “quality” has not been defined.335 In order to measure the extent
to which quality education depends on accreditors’ actions, there must be a
generally accepted definition of “quality education.” For the reasons
discussed below, it is impossible to measure quality; thus outcome
uncertainty suggests that neither outcome-based nor behavior-based
governance would be effective.
Finally, though an evaluation of goal conflict and task programmability
suggests that outcome-based governance could reduce agency costs, a
consideration of outcome measurability shows that these evaluations would
be impossible. Similar to outcome uncertainty, outcome measurability
presupposes that an outcome is defined. Because the outcome of “quality
education” is not defined, the outcome is not measurable and outcomebased governance would be ineffective.
Ultimately, the four factors above reveal a fundamental flaw underlying
both outcome-based and behavior-based governance: we do not know how
to define or measure a “quality education.”
Any outcome-based
governance that would tie the agent’s reward to government desired
outcomes are ineffective because there is no clear desired outcome.
Similarly, increasing regulation of accreditors’ behaviors and increasing
oversight fail absent a clear definition of “quality.”336
As discussed in Part II.B.2, there are several methods of defining and
measuring educational quality.337 Each method fails to fully capture all
aspects of quality because the value of education depends entirely on the
subjective perceptions of the individual.338 There is no inherent objective
value of education. Rather, it depends on the student’s hierarchical ranking
of choices based on their individual circumstances.339 Individuals take a
number of factors into consideration in determining the value of education:
financial constraints, existing education level, intended career path,
personal ideologies, individual preferences for subject matter, etc. Any

333. An additional issue presented by task programmability is that for accreditation, the
task and outcome are inextricably linked; therefore, defining the task would necessarily
involve defining the outcome, as discussed later in this section.
334. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part II.B.
336. An additional drawback to these governing mechanisms is the cost of monitoring
outcomes or behavior. See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part II.B.2.
338. See supra Part II.B.1.
339. See supra Part II.B.1.
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standardized value of education for all students would be inaccurate
because of these individual preferences.
The subjective nature of educational quality renders both outcome-based
and behavior-based governance of accrediting bodies ineffective. In light
of the agency costs that exist and the ineffectiveness of these controls, the
government should sever the tie between accreditation and federal funding.
B. Decoupling Accreditation and Federal Student Loans
Amending the HEA to decouple accreditation and federal funding for
student loans is the most effective means of reducing agency costs and
student loan burdens. This section addresses (1) the flaws of the proposals
for reform mentioned in Part III, (2) the benefits of decoupling the systems,
and (3) the potential criticisms of this decoupling solution.
1. Flawed Proposals for Reform
The first four proposals discussed in Part III will not solve the principalagent dilemma posed by the current federal funding-accreditation
relationship. First, those who argue that no changes are necessary believe
that rising student loan debts do not signal a crisis.340 However, as
discussed in Part I.A, the unprecedented rise in student loan debt has led to
increased default rates and higher tuition costs, burdening both individual
borrowers and the economy as a whole.341 These burdens have ultimately
made education less accessible, undermining the purpose of the HEA.342
Therefore, some type of reform of the federal funding-accreditation system
is necessary.
The second proposed reform, changing the pay structure, is a method of
outcome-based governance that seeks to eliminate the conflict of interest
inherent in the existing fee structure.343 This proposal fails to address two
concerns: (1) divergent interests beyond the financial conflict of interest
and (2) the lack of a defined outcome. First, while separating the financial
tie between higher education institutions and accreditors may reduce the
financial incentives to accredit schools, it does not address the issue of
collegiality among evaluators or fundamental ideological differences.344
Second, as previously discussed, this outcome-based monitoring would not
be effective unless the government conditioned payment on the
achievement of a defined outcome.345 If the government provided funding
without tying it to a defined metric, the incentives of the accreditors may
not change.

340. See supra notes 66, 85 (discussing the argument that the increase in student loan
debt is not a crisis or a bubble that could seriously affect the U.S. economy).
341. See supra Part I.A.3.
342. See supra Part I.A.3.
343. See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 301–06 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part IV.A.
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Similarly, the third proposal’s suggestion that the government should
define quality would not be a successful reform measure. As discussed
above, the subjective theory of value and the highly individualized nature of
educational choices dictate that a single definition of “quality” would be
arbitrary and fail to capture the costs and benefits of higher education.346
Finally, while encouraging competition among accreditors is a valuable
reform, the fourth proposal fails to contend with accreditors’ and the
government’s divergent interests.347
Increased competition among
accreditors would break the cartel held by current accreditors.348
Accreditors would be faced with the threat of losing USDE recognition if
they did not thoroughly evaluate schools. However, as discussed above,
without clear instruction about how the government wants accreditors to
evaluate schools, this is an empty threat. Therefore, increasing competition
among accreditors alone will not solve the agency problem.349
2. The Benefits of Decoupling
Unlike the reform proposals discussed above, severing the ties between
accreditation and federal funding will solve the principal-agent dilemma
and encourage transparency in the industry, ultimately helping students
make informed decisions. Decoupling accreditation and federal funding
will (a) serve the government’s and accreditors’ interests while returning
independence to institutions; (b) encourage innovation in the higher
education industry; (c) generate competition among accreditors; and
(d) increase transparency in the industry.
a. Fulfilling the Government’s and Accreditors’ Interests
The divergent interests of the government and accreditors in the federal
funding-accreditation system have resulted in neither party’s goals being
accomplished.350 Accreditation, once a badge of quality, has become a de
facto requirement now that it is linked to federal funding.351 Under the
current regime, accreditation’s other functions—for instance, easing
transfer among schools and improving best practices—are inconsequential
compared to its role as a gatekeeper of federal funds.352 Thus, accreditors’
goals of quality assurance and improvement are not being met. Similarly,
government interests are not being served under the current regime because
accreditors are ill suited to the consumer protection role.353

346. See supra Parts II.B, IV.A.
347. See supra notes 284–306 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
349. Decoupling the accreditation and federal loan systems will result in competition
among accreditors, and will therefore capture these benefits. See infra Part IV.B.2.
350. See supra notes 284–306 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part III.B.
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Decoupling accreditation and federal funding will restore institutional
autonomy to both accreditors and the USDE. First, accreditation, which
was intended to be a nongovernmental peer-review process, will regain its
independence from government interference.354 Accreditors will be free to
evaluate schools using their own criteria and standards for quality.
Furthermore, the separation would give accreditors the freedom to develop
more complex evaluation processes; rather than providing a binary “yes or
no” response to schools, accreditors could create more granular assessment
of schools and perhaps create a graded system of accreditation.355
Similarly, decoupling student loans and accreditation would allow the
government to develop its own system for determining federal student loan
funding, focusing on its interest in public accountability and consumer
protection. The government would have more flexibility once freed of the
binary gatekeeping accreditation offers.356
The government could
introduce a form of risk-based pricing, allowing interest rates or volume of
student loans to vary depending on a school or program’s performance. By
separating student loans and accreditation, the government and accreditors
could create these tailored programs.
b. Encouraging Innovation in Higher Education
In addition to returning institutional autonomy to the USDE and
accreditors, allowing them to more effectively meet their goals, decoupling
accreditation and student loans would encourage innovation in the higher
education industry. The current accreditation scheme stifles innovation
because accreditation focuses on traditional business models of higher
education institutions.357 Therefore, nontraditional higher education,
including many online or distance programs, have been unable to get
federal funding.358 By separating accreditation and student loans, the
government could encourage diversity in the education industry. Less
expensive models of education could be developed to compete with the
traditional models. Because each student values education subjectively,
these nontraditional models may be a more appropriate fit for some
students.359
c. Generating Competition Among Accreditors
Third, if the government removes itself from the accreditation process,
there would be more competition within the accreditation industry. The
current system, which emphasizes the role of accreditation in the federal
loan system, values those accreditors that have received USDE

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See supra Part III.B.
See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 43–44.
See id.
See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 18–19.
See id.
See id.
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recognition.360 This recognition process blocks new accreditors from
entering the industry in several ways. First, the existing recognized
accreditors act as a barrier to entry in that they have reputations for
credibility.361 Additionally, in order to receive USDE recognition,
accreditors must have two years of experience accrediting schools.362
Given the existing accreditors’ entrenchment in the higher education
industry, this requirement is difficult to meet.
If the government played no role in the accreditation process, more
accreditors could enter the industry. These accreditors, faced with
increased competition, would be forced to demonstrate to the public that
they add value to the education industry. In distinguishing themselves from
their competitors, these accreditors would be incentivized to make their
processes public, which is discussed further below.
d. Increasing Transparency in the Industry
Finally, decoupling accreditation and the federal student loan program
would increase transparency in both the higher education and student loan
industries, allowing students to make more informed choices about higher
education and loans. Separating the loan and accreditation process would
create two separate systems that provide students with two different types
of information.
First, the government lender would provide information in the consumer
protection role, providing financial data about particular schools and loan
choices.363 Second, the accrediting agencies would continue to assess
schools at a more granular level, focusing on more intangible indications of
“quality.” These accreditors, competing against potential new accreditors
in the industry, would have an incentive to disclose the methods they use to
assess quality, including the metrics and results that are typically kept
confidential.364
Both the financial information collected by the government lender and
the more intangible assessments conducted by accreditors provide students
with information to help inform their choice of education and financing.
Rather than simply telling students that a school is accredited and thus
eligible for funding, a decoupled regime would provide more detailed
information. Students with more information can make more rational
decisions about which schools to attend and which type and amount of loan
to choose, based on their subjective value determinations.

360. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (discussing how higher education
institutions must be accredited by a recognized accrediting body to receive funding).
362. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
363. Determining how the government should choose who receives loans is beyond the
scope of this Note; however, the government should maintain its consumer protection role by
focusing more on financial metrics and factors that affect a student’s ability to repay the
loan, acting as a lender, rather than focusing on pedagogical issues.
364. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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3. Criticisms of Decoupling
Despite the benefits of decoupling discussed above, critics of this plan
may argue that it could lead to (a) a new bureaucracy, (b) the elimination of
accreditation, and (c) government funding being diverted to the “wrong”
schools. While decoupling accreditation and federal student loans would
effect major changes in the higher education industry, each of these
criticisms overstates the negative consequences of such a change.
a. Creating a New Bureaucracy
First, critics may argue that once the government is no longer relying on
accreditation to assess quality, it will form a new bureaucracy faced with
the same dilemma of determining which schools should receive federal
funding. The USDE’s proposed federal scorecards, a composite rating
system, suggest that the government is already moving towards creating its
own requirements for funding.365
While decoupling accreditation and student loans will force the
government to make independent decisions about which schools and
programs it will fund, the government can do so without creating a new
bureaucracy. The government is a lender for student loans, and should base
its requirements for these loans on statistical data that indicates if the loans
will be repaid, avoiding pedagogical judgments. Market forces and public
opinion will assess the quality of a school’s educational program, so there
will be no need for a bureaucracy to grade or rate educational quality.
b. Eliminating the Role of Accreditation
Critics may further argue that allowing the government to create its own
standards for student loans would essentially eliminate the need for
accreditation. While accreditors would be faced with increased competition
and would perhaps be forced to change their behaviors, they would not
necessarily be rendered useless. Accreditation serves many purposes
beyond its gatekeeping role: assisting institutions with self-improvement,
engendering public confidence, enabling students to transfer among
schools, and creating standards for professional degrees.366 Accreditation
would continue to serve these purposes even if the process was independent
from the federal loan system, as it was for decades before the enactment of
the GI Bill.367

365. See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Part I.B.3.
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c. Funding the “Wrong” Schools
Finally, some critics may fear that under a decoupled regime, accredited
schools may not receive funding while unaccredited schools continue to be
funded. If federal student loans are independent of accreditation, schools
will fall into one of four categories: (1) accredited with funding,
(2) unaccredited without funding, (3) accredited without funding, and
(4) unaccredited with funding. Though the first two categories are the same
as under the current federal funding-accreditation system, the third and
fourth categories present unique situations.
First, this decoupling solution may result in a group of accredited but
unfunded institutions.368 Because many institutions rely on federal student
loans, these institutions may be forced to close despite their accredited
status.369 However, this criticism fails to consider alternative funding
options. A shrinking public student loans market would incentivize
students to look to the private student loan market.370 Additionally, these
schools would be encouraged to change their behavior to entice students to
attend. They could increase scholarships, lower tuition rates, or create new
payment programs for students. The government should not fund risky
loans with little hope of being repaid simply because an institution has been
accredited.
The second potential new category of schools under a decoupled regime
would be unaccredited institutions receiving federal funding for student
loans. Given the subjective nature of “quality education,”371 however, the
government should focus on its role as a lender regardless of the
institution’s accreditation status. The government should allow the private
market to assess a school’s quality, and base its lending decisions on more
objective criteria. Additionally, as discussed above, providing student loan
funding to unaccredited schools could foster innovation in the higher
education industry.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the student loan program and accreditation
contributes to the growing student loan crisis. In this relationship, the
government and accreditors have divergent interests: the government is
concerned with consumer protection and ensuring that its loans are
distributed to “quality institutions,” while accreditors focus on long-term
“quality” improvement and collegiality. The government’s attempt to align
these incentives through increased control over the accreditation industry
has been ineffective because these regulations require a definition of
“quality” education. The highly individualized nature of educational
368. The government will also be able to classify schools into different tiers of funding,
rather than simply deciding funding on an all-or-nothing basis.
369. See supra notes 92, 101 and accompanying text.
370. Increased demand for private loans would incentivize private lenders to loan to
students, supervised by Dodd-Frank regulations. See supra Part I.A.2.
371. See supra Part II.B.
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choices and the subjective theory of value dictate that any single definition
of “quality” would be arbitrary and fail to capture the true value of
education.
Amending the HEA to decouple federal student loans and accreditation
would allow the government and accreditors to develop their own methods
of evaluating higher education institutions. In addition to eliminating the
agency problem, severing the tie between these two programs would
increase the amount of information available in the market, allowing
students to make more rational subjective decisions about their education
and finances. This increased transparency, combined with a more prudent
federal student loan program, would ultimately help reduce the effects of
the student loan crisis.

